Aristotle on Friendship by Green, Daniel
 In the age of the Internet, we seek friendship in ways 
never imagined in the time of Aristotle.  Is it possible that 
two people connected only by digital signals and the urge 
to kill ogres could ever really be virtuous friends?  First 
I will explore what Aristotle describes and defines as the 
lesser friendships of utility and pleasure, and continue on 
to the good or virtuous friendships.  Then I will discuss the 
possibility of such friendships existing over the Internet, 
and conclude with my answer to the question above.
 For a relationship to be considered a friendship, “men 
must feel goodwill for each other…be aware of each other’s 
goodwill, and the cause of their goodwill must be one of 
the lovable qualities…” (Aristotle 1996, p. 206).  The lovable 
qualities are that which are “lovable, and that… is either what 
is good, or pleasant, or useful” (p. 206).  “Nothing is more 
characteristic of friends than that they seek each other’s 
society: poor men desire their friends’ assistance, and even 
the most prosperous wish for their companionship… but it is 
impossible for men to spend their time together unless they 
give each other pleasure, or have common tastes” (p. 211). 
To be more specific, Aristotle adds a qualification to his definition 
above: “the feeling of goodwill must be known to its object” (p. 
207).  Friendships “…require time and intimacy… and so you 
cannot admit him to friendship or really be friends, before each 
has shown the other that he is worthy of friendship and has 
won his confidence” (p. 209). By qualifying this requirement 
as such, Aristotle eliminates the possibility of unintended or 
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one-sided friendship, where an individual A is “friends” with 
another individual B, despite the fact that B has no intention of 
being so with A.  Also, even if A feels that he and B are friends, 
it is not an active friendship unless B is equally engaged in the 
friendship.  “[P]ersons who wish another good for his own sake, 
if the feeling is not reciprocated, are merely said to feel goodwill 
for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed friendship” 
(p. 207). Friendships are thus further limited to relationships in 
which two people are reciprocally sharing active goodwill, which 
is taken a step further to remove the possibility of friendship 
with inanimate objects: “the term Friendship is not applied 
to love for inanimate objects, since here there is no return of 
affection, and also no wish for the good of the object” (p. 207).
  Aristotle also distinguishes the possibility of two people 
who could be friends because of their goodwill status, but 
are not so because neither has initiated an active friendship: 
For a man often feels goodwill towards persons whom 
he has never seen, but whom he believes to be good 
or useful, and one of these persons may also entertain 
the same feeling towards him. Here then we have a 
case of two people mutually well-disposed, whom 
nevertheless we cannot speak of as friends, because 
they are not aware of each other’s regard (p. 207).
 Of the two non-virtuous species of friendship, 
utility is the least similar to the virtuous relationship: 
Friends of this kind do not indeed frequent each 
other’s company much, for in some cases they are not 
even pleasing to each other, and therefore have no 
use for friendly intercourse unless they are mutually 
profitable; since their pleasure in each other goes no 
further than their expectations of advantage (p. 208).
Due to their shallow, and sometimes tumultuous nature, 
friendships of utility operate more like exploitation, 
whereas a virtuous friendship resembles a cooperative 
effort: “the friends associate with each other for profit, 
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If the prosperous do not need useful friends in the traditional 
sense of sharing resources, isn’t it true that they need 
pleasant friends as a matter of utility?  Aristotle qualifies 
pleasant friendships as requiring “enjoying each other’s 
company” (Aristotle 223), and utility friendships “in some 
cases they are not even pleasing to each other” (p. 208).
Nor again are complaints likely to occur between friends 
whose motive is pleasure either; for if they enjoy each 
other’s company, both alike get what they wish for; 
and indeed it would seem ridiculous to find fault with 
somebody for not being agreeable to you, when you need 
not associate with him if you do not want to do so (p. 223).
 The goal of those who seek a friendship 
which is perfect, balanced, and of the “good” seek 
what Aristotle refers to as a virtuous friendship. 
“The perfect form of friendship is that between 
the good, and those who resemble each other in 
virtue.  For these friends wish each alike the other’s 
good in respect of their goodness, and they are good 
in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of 
their friends for their friend’s sake who are friends 
in the fullest sense, since they love each other for 
themselves and not accidentally” (pp. 208-209).
Aristotle defines a friend as “one who wishes and promotes 
by action, the real or apparent good of another for the 
other’s sake… [and] one who wishes the existence and 
preservation of his friend for the friend’s sake” (p. 238).
A virtuous friendship begins at friendly relations, but 
requires more to be considered a friendship.  “People who 
enter into friendly relations quickly have the wish to be 
friends, but cannot really be friends without… knowing each 
other to be [worthy of friendship]; the wish to be friends 
is a quick growth, but friendship it is not” (Aristotle 209). 
“Also for perfect friendship you must get to know a 
and so each always wants more, and thinks he is getting 
less than his due… and the one who is doing a service can 
never supply all that the one receiving it wants” (p. 224). 
 Virtuous friendships are based on a shared like-
character, while friendships of utility “[seem] most frequently 
to spring from opposites, for instance a friendship between 
a poor man and a rich one, or between an ignorant man 
and a learned; for a person desiring something which he 
happens to lack will give something else in return for it” (p. 
216).  Aristotle also recognizes and highlights the possibility 
of an accidental “attraction between opposites… what they 
actually desire is the mean between them” (p. 216), as opposed 
to a motivated search for oppositely minded individuals.
 Friendships based on utility, in which each participant 
uses the other’s resources out of convenience, run their course as 
change occurs within the resources or motives shared between 
the two.  Friendships of pleasure, however, are less subject to 
changing resources and more so to emotion. “[The] young are 
prone to fall in love, as love is chiefly guided by emotion, and 
grounded on pleasure; hence they form attachments quickly and 
give them up quickly” (p. 208).  Friendships of utility change based 
on what each friend has, while friendships of pleasure change 
based upon what each friend wants.  “[The] things that please 
them change as their age alters; hence they both form friendships 
and drop them quickly, since their affections alter with what gives 
them pleasure, and the tastes of youth change quickly” (p. 208).
 Pleasant friendships require two people to actually enjoy 
one another’s company, “for that is how they get the enjoyment 
of their friendship” (Aristotle 208).  Even those who need no 
assistance materially need someone to share their fortune with. 
[Those] blessed with great prosperity have no need 
of useful friends, but do need pleasant ones, since 
they desire some society; and though they may put 
up with what is unpleasant for a short time, no one 
would stand it continually… and therefore the 
rich seek for friends who will be pleasant (p. 213).
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qualities are rarely found in combination” (p. 211).  Thus, he has 
differentiated between the random and rare combination of 
friendship of pleasure and utility which is not shared between 
good men, such as if two bad men used one another’s resources 
to more effectively act badly, while at the same time genuinely 
enjoying each other’s company, this rare combination of pleasure 
and utility does not a virtuous friendship make, since they are 
not possibly “slow to believe anybody’s word about a friend who 
he has himself tried and tested for many years, and with them 
there is mutual confidence, the incapacity ever to do each other 
wrong” (p. 210), as both are bad men and cannot be trusted.
“Thus the friendship of inferior people is evil, for they 
take part together in inferior pursuits, and by becoming 
like each other are made positively evil. But the friendship 
of good is good, and grows with their intercourse.  And 
they seem actually to become better by putting their 
friendship into practice, and because they correct each 
other’s faults, for each takes the impress from the other 
of those traits in him that give him pleasure…” (p. 251).
 Finally, friendships are necessary for happiness. 
“[It] seems strange that if we attribute all good things to 
the happy man we should not assign him friends, which 
we consider the greatest of external goods” (p. 246). 
 Aristotle realized that a friendship based on 
pleasure, especially between children, can appear similar 
to virtuous friendship.  He addresses this issue as such:
“Of these two inferior kinds of friendship, the 
one that more closely resembles true friendship is 
that based on pleasure, in which the same benefit 
is conferred by both parties, and they enjoy each 
other’s company, or have common tastes; as is the 
case of friendships of young people.  For in these 
there is more generosity of feeling, whereas the 
friendship of utility is a thing for sordid souls” (p. 213).
 To prevent confusion about the difference between 
man thoroughly, and become intimate with him, which 
is a very difficult thing to do.  But it is possible to like 
a number of persons for their utility and pleasantness, 
for useful and pleasant people are plentiful, and the 
benefits they confer can be enjoyed at once” (p. 212).
Another requirement of a virtuous relationship is that good men 
be exclusively involved: “only good men can be friends for what 
they are in themselves; since bad men do not take pleasure in each 
other, save as they get some advantage from each other” (p. 210). 
Thus are the necessary conditions for a virtuous friendship, 
but how does Aristotle describe such a friendship? 
“The society of each other is the most desirable thing 
there is. For friendship is essentially a partnership.  And 
a man stands in the same relation to a friend as to himself, 
but … the consciousness of his friend’s existence… [is 
also a good]; but this consciousness is actualized by 
intercourse; hence friends naturally desire each other’s 
society.  And whatever pursuit it is that constitutes 
existence for a man or that makes his life worth living, 
he desires to share that pursuit with his friends” (p. 251).
 Unlike in a friendship of pleasure or utility, “in a 
friendship based on virtue, each party is eager to benefit 
the other” and “no complaints nor quarrels can arise, 
since nobody is angry with one who loves him and benefits 
him” (p. 223).  Between the men, “the absolutely good 
and pleasant are the chief objects of affection” (p. 209). 
 Further, “such friendships are of course rare, 
because such men are few, and such friendship is 
naturally permanent, since it combines in itself all the 
attributes that friends ought to possess” (p. 209).  “Hence 
the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue 
to be good; and virtue is a permanent quality” (p. 209).
 To differentiate further between the lesser friendships 
and the virtuous, “these two secondary forms of friendship are not 
very likely to coincide: men do not make friends with each other 
both for utility and pleasure at the same time, since accidental 
74 a L U C E R N A a 75GREEN / ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP
coach of the Kansas City Chiefs, given our similar characters, 
but sending him a letter and asking him to be my friend will 
very likely end without result.  I have to get his attention, 
and arouse his goodwill with an excellent display.  Perhaps 
by approaching Mr. Edwards at a restaurant and displaying 
a depth of football knowledge rarely seen by a normal 
fan, I have at least demonstrated my deservingness of his 
goodwill.  I at least got a picture to commemorate the event.
 Turning now to the problem of the Internet 
relationship, and whether or not such a pairing of two 
individuals connected only by electronic pulses of 1 
and 0 could ever grow into a true virtuous friendship.
Aristotle limits virtuous relationships, and as 
such arguably prevents such friendships from 
existing online, without human-to-human contact. 
...friends when in each other’s company derive 
pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, 
whereas friends who are asleep or parted are not 
actively friendly, yet have the disposition to be 
so.  For separation does not destroy friendship 
absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise.  If 
however the absence be prolonged, it seems to cause 
the friendly feeling itself to be forgotten… (p. 211).
As with pen pals, or two great friends of virtue separated by 
miles, email communication cannot prevent the loss of active 
exercise.  To share words, ideas and goodwill over any medium 
other than face-to-face communication can cause the loss of 
friendly feeling described above.  All is not lost however, as in the 
case of online games, where friends actively participate in team 
work to complete an objective, all the while able to communicate 
in real time and witness almost firsthand the actions of the 
other, it is possible yet that friendship can continue in earnest.
 Another serious limitation put down by 
Aristotle is on the number of friends possible:
“It is not possible to have many friends in the 
full meaning of the word friendship, any more 
goodwill and friendship, I will now highlight some 
differentiations made in book nine.  “Goodwill appears to be 
an element of friendly feeling, but it is not the same thing as 
friendship; for it can be felt towards strangers, and it can be 
unknown to its object, whereas friendship cannot” (Aristotle 
240).  This clarification harkens back to the requirements of 
friendship being intentionally shared in both directions by two 
parties, neither of which can be an inanimate object.  “Well-
wishers are not necessarily friends: they merely desire the good 
of those whose well-wishers they are, and would not actively 
assist them to attain it, not be put to any trouble on their 
behalf” (p. 240).  I believe what he should have written was “and 
[perhaps] would not assist them to attain it, [perhaps] not be put 
to any trouble on their behalf,” as even wishing well and putting 
themselves through a bit of trouble, or helping one to attain 
good, does not necessarily constitute friendship assuming the 
one who is wished well doesn’t return the attention or effort.
Two further points on goodwill I would like to highlight are:
“Hence, extending the meaning of the term 
friendship we may say that goodwill is inoperative 
friendship, which when it continues and reaches the 
point of intimacy may become friendship proper 
– not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or 
pleasure, for these do not arouse goodwill” (p. 241).
By defining goodwill as inoperative friendship, he is essentially 
calling goodwill the stem cell or perhaps the diving board of 
friendship, whereas you must either have present the “stem 
cell” of goodwill from which friendship will grow, or you must 
climb onto the “diving board” of goodwill before taking the leap 
towards friendship.  Each metaphor has its own value; stem cells 
illustrate an open beginning, and the diving board represents 
the figurative “leap” required to enter friendship.  Finally, by 
asserting that, generally, “true goodwill is aroused by some 
kind of excellence or moral goodness: it springs up when one 
person thinks another beautiful or brave or the like…” (p. 241), 
Aristotle addresses the age-old problem of attention-getting. 
I, for example, might make great friends with Herm Edwards, 
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in real time.  To dissolve this idea, I point to SmarterChild, 
a user who appears and discusses anything like a regular 
AIM user.  SmarterChild is a “bot,” a computer controlled 
automated messenger, who can interact based on context 
clues and hold a conversation with a user, never letting on 
that the person is in fact, talking to a computer.  While “bots” 
in online games obviously lack human characteristics of play 
and communication, text-based AIM bots are as human as any 
user when communicating via text chat.  Aristotle requires that 
friendship occur between two humans, “the term Friendship 
is not applied to love for inanimate objects, since here there 
is no return of affection, and also no wish for the good of the 
object” (p. 207).  Thus, because the only way to truly verify that 
this person you have never met is human is to indeed meet 
them in person, it is impossible to have a virtuous friendship 
via AIM or other instant messaging services without having met 
the person prior.  Internet gaming is another matter entirely.
 “Suppose one friend to have remained the same while 
the other has improved, and become greatly the superior 
in virtue: ought the latter to keep up the friendship?” (p. 
238).  Aristotle answers that “without [enjoying each other’s 
company] intercourse and therefore friendship are… 
impossible” (p. 238).  While intercourse is more possible in 
online gaming than in general Internet activity, the inherent 
nature of the gaming society online is what distinguishes the 
relationships formed there as utilitarian and not virtuous. 
 I look to my great friend in real life, who plays such 
games online as Kornja.  He had what appeared to be a quite 
close relationship with many members of his guild in World of 
Warcraft, where he and 39 of his closest friends would join to 
fight together.  He was close friends with three or four members, 
and friendly to the rest, but in time as the best members of the 
group got better at the game, a chasm began to form between 
the top 5 players (Kornja included) and the other 35 members. 
Unwilling to cut ties with his friends in the lower segment, Kornja 
stayed with the group despite the other four greats threatening 
to leave.  When the four best left, Kornja realized that his two 
friends in the top four were only his friends when he could 
help them achieve victory, and were perfectly willing to leave 
than it is to be in love with many people at once 
… and it is not easy for the same person to like 
a number of people at once, nor indeed perhaps 
can good men be found in large numbers” (p. 212).
Whether the issue of online friendships is limited to people 
known only online, and never met in person or not, to keep 
intimately close to many people is a difficult chore.  It has 
seemed in my personal experience that I can sustain up to three 
deep friendships at a time, while having loose friendships and 
sharing general goodwill with a nearly limitless number at the 
same time.  When one friend is online less often, if the time 
I normally spend talking or playing with them is taken up by 
playing or talking with someone not normally considered my 
friend, in time the new friend can bump the old friend out of 
their place of honor, until the first friend makes it a point to 
reclaim that position.  To distinguish this action from simply 
exchanging friends of utility, I point out that there is no malice 
in placing one above the other, in fact there is never a specific 
action of even thinking of one over the other, one simply begins 
to fit into my life better than the other, and when the first fits 
better again, he or she resumes where we left off to begin with.
 Finally, I would like to address two issues of disparity 
between friends:  “…when a wide disparity arises between two 
friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else; 
they no longer remain nor expect to remain friends…when 
one becomes very remote from the other, as God is remote 
from man, it can continue no longer.” (p. 215).  My experience 
is that internet friendships have an advantage over personal 
friendships in that destructive behaviors such as alcohol abuse 
have less effect.  While I do not condone self-destructive 
behavior, it is easier for both parties to ignore when not face 
to face with the issue, as we would be if personal friends. 
The negative to this is that it is easy for one to completely 
misrepresent themselves online, which brings me to my 
final point on the possibility of virtual virtuous friendships.
 Many would argue that friendships can be formed over 
instant messaging programs, such as AIM, where, much like a 
telephone conversation, two people communicate directly and 
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him behind.  “…differences between friends most frequently 
arise when the nature of their friendship is not what they think 
it is” (p. 237).  Despite his loyalty, the guild collapsed beneath 
him as other less skillful players attempted to fill the power 
vacuum left by their departed leadership, and now, months later, 
Kornja has lost contact with all of his Warcraft friends.  Luckily, 
his new-found free time has allowed him to reconnect with 
the real world, and build better friendships with real people. 
It seems the only true virtuous friendships exist in reality, 
as it is impossible to realize another’s intentions online. 
Many of the requirements for friendship, such as shared 
experience, shared character, and goodwill are perfectly 
possible online, but because you can never be sure that both 
parties share in the matter similarly, as is required, Internet 
friendships remain utilitarian or for pleasure, as Kornja 
has learned.  Luckily for Kornja, he has my friendship in 
reality… until he finds out I’m only using him for his bulldogs.
80 a L U C E R N A a 81GREEN / ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP
